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Hermeneutics ‘Reloaded’: From Science/Philosophy 
Dichotomy to Critical Hermeneutics 





Currently, hermeneutics is no longer a koinè, yet it pervades the field 
of human knowledge on different and diverse levels. With the decline 
of philosophical hermeneutics, the inheritance of a rich tradition of 
thought, there remains some very important problematic and 
speculative cornerstones and a poorly ordered horizon of 
hermeneutical practices and procedures, more or less technical 
and/or speculative. From this composite picture the (negative) 
possibility of truths without method and methods without truth or 
validity emerges; and therefore, again, emerge the problems of 
consistency, rigour and philosophical legitimacy, and the risk of non-
rational seductions and/or ideological distortions. From another point 
of view, philosophy and reflection within hermeneutical traditions 
have elaborated sufficient critical content and devices for the 
definition of an organised, rigorous and controlled model of a 
comprehensive procedure. From this perspective, Paul Ricoeur’s 
philosophical work seems emblematic. From his philosophy it is 
possible to extract a general model of a non-philosophically-engaged 
hermeneutical method, which is valuable for the human and social 
sciences as well as a useful procedure for interdisciplinary work. This 
is critical hermeneutics: a specific form of speculative and theoretical 
hermeneutics whose methodological and epistemological foundation 
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mirrors the new form of the contemporary hermeneutic-scientific 
koinè. 
Keywords: critical hermeneutics, ontology, epistemology, fact, 
value, ideology   
 
 
1. Introduction: Hermeneutics’ Persistent Legitimacy and Its 
Paradoxes   
I am in full agreement with what David Pellauer says at the start of 
his 2014 paper, ‘Work to Be Done’, dedicated to hermeneutics and its 
current task. Indeed, even more, the hypothetical and circumstantial 
position according to which we can overlook the distinction between 
philosophical hermeneutics and hermeneutic philosophy is 
generalised on the basis of the assumption that: ‘hermeneutic 
philosophy is philosophy that takes seriously the question of 
interpretation in relation to understanding, where understanding is 
both the result of interpretation and, quite paradoxically, also what 
motivates interpretation in the first place’ (Pellauer, 2014: 1). The 
only distinction that is necessary, and to which we will return later, is 
between hermeneutics as a technique and hermeneutics as 
philosophy. It is a distinction that has aspects of overlap and 
interrelation to the extent that, on the one hand, the technique is 
nourished by and involved in theoretical and methodological research, 
and on the other, philosophy is also exercised on a theoretical-
methodological level. In fact, it is around the relationship between 
interpretation and comprehension that the legitimacy and speculative 
value of hermeneutics is at stake. This relationship defines the terrain 
of its problematicness and opens up the space to a series of quasi-
paradoxical, if not fully paradoxical, aspects. 
With Pellauer, I say: ‘(…) we exist as understanding, 
understanding ourselves, others, our world, things in that world, our 
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possibilities in that world’ (3). Actually, Schleiermacher already 
explained that hermeneutics’ role or end is not interpretation, but 
understanding: Verstehen als die Aufgabe der Hermeneutik (Die 
Aphorismen, 1805). This is the source of the epistemic, cognitive and 
speculative strength of hermeneutics, because it enables 
hermeneutics to move beyond the one-dimensionality of analytical-
descriptive and scientific-explanatory knowledge, and to synthesise 
knowledge data, values, creation of meaning and inspiration in a 
unified theoretical practical synthesis, closer to both the human being 
and life-world reality than emerges by calculation and measurement 
only. However, this is also the source of the epistemic, cognitive and 
speculative weakness of hermeneutics, constantly driven to be 
articulate between truth and evaluation, knowledge and interest, 
reality and ideology. A discipline capable of actively supporting and 
nurturing both nihilistic and relativistic conceptions as well as positive 
and affirmative conceptions reveals all about its flexibility, 
ambivalence and ambiguity. On the other hand, however, some 
degree of mixtures of the same kind does not lack even the so-called 
‘analytic’ and scientific knowledge, as above all, today, that much 
analytic thought advances a purely ideological pretence of purity and 
perfection, and much scientific knowledge conceals an idolatry of 
human intelligence, manipulability of nature and the possibilities of 
technology. 
The problem is deep, and it is deeper than the problem of 
knowledge. In some way, hermeneutics establishes and maintains as 
radical and perpetual the problematicness of truth, value, 
goodness/rightness and legitimacy with regards to knowing, acting, 
doing and even existing. And everything is knotted on the point of 
(evident) precedence and the greater degree of completeness and 
significance of understanding on knowing.  
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Through this, I am not supporting the reasoning behind the 
ontological or ontological existential anchorage of understanding to 
the Being as intended by Heidegger and Gadamer, I am just 
suggesting that hermeneutical understanding is the form of human 
existence as human existence that is, in his/her relations with 
himself/herself, with his/her Erlebnisse, with others and the 
environmental context, with values and the world and even with 
abstract and transcendent ideas. (In fact, knowing is inevitably 
anchored to some guiding interest, and there is no need to bother the 
young Habermas to grasp this point). Even without embracing the 
ontological-existential idea of the grounding of understanding within 
the Being, one can grasp the truth, validity and scope of what 
Schleirmacher already pointed out: namely that only by means of 
hermeneutics does the child arrive at the meaning of words (Jedes 
Kind kommt nur durch Hermeneutik zur Wortbedeutung; Die 
Aphorismen, 1805). Conversely, without contravening this thesis, 
science is today able to identify with precision and in a structured 
formula the concatenation of neurobiological, cognitive and functional 
processes that make a child’s interaction with the mother and the 
world possible and therefore leading to his/her mental and 
experiential evolution.       
Thus, point of strength of hermeneutics is also its point of 
weakness, and this is not the only paradoxical element that 
characterises it:  
(I) Philosophically, we no longer live in the season of 
hermeneutics, but that of analytic philosophy (of mind and of 
language). Today is the season of rooting (and radicalisation) on the 
naturalistic pragmatist paradigm. Hermeneutics no longer has the 
pervasiveness of a koinè (see Vattimo, 1987), except within a certain 
circle of followers and believers. Yet philosophical hermeneutics 
remains and continues to affect many disciplines and scientific 
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research: from dynamic and relational psychology to 
neurophenomenology, from social psychology to critical and 
qualitative-interpretative sociology, from theory of law to literature, 
and from history to political theory, etc. Today, hermeneutics is no 
longer koinè, and yet it persists in pervading the field of human 
knowledge.  
(II) With the decline of philosophical hermeneutics, the teachings 
of an important tradition of thought remain, as well as it remains a 
series of speculative residuals, fertile problematic issues, and a not 
well-ordered horizon of hermeneutical practices and procedures.  
From this variegated picture the (negative) possibility of truths 
without method and methods without truth or validity emerges; and 
therefore, again, there emerges the problem of consistency, rigour 
philosophical legitimacy, as well as the risk of non-rational and 
ideological seductions and distortions. However, from a different point 
of view, philosophy (in general) and hermeneutics (more specifically) 
have elaborated sufficient critical content and devices for the 
definition of an organised, rigorous and controlled model of a 
comprehensive procedure. The case of Paul Ricoeur’s philosophical 
work seems emblematic from this point of view. A general and 
generalisable model of hermeneutical procedure can be extracted 
from his philosophy that does not implicate an ideological or a value-
speculative personal engagement.   
(III) The hermeneutical solution generates the problem, and the 
nature of the problem determines only one type of possible solution: 
that of a huge philosophical downsizing, in favour of a more 
meaningful theoretical practical generalisation. To renounce 
speculative dogmatism or school adherence is not the same as 
renouncing the truth; and renouncing hermeneutical radicalisation 
does not mean renouncing rigour, abandoning the primacy of 
philosophy, or suffering cultural diminution. Rather, more than ever 
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today, it is necessary to start from the datum that all forms of 
philosophical knowledge and philosophical practice not equipped with 
self-reflection and self-criticism disposals are already oriented 
towards radicalisation and dogmatisation. The solution is to keep and 
practice problematically. The solution is to seek aporia and conflictual 
difficulty, that is, to exercise philosophy as a perpetual cognitive-
procedural tension and as a tensional mediation between paradigms 
and knowledge. This is not the expression of restlessness of thought 
or mind: it is philosophical research in scientific form. Critical 
hermeneutics in all disciplinary domains can be a critical procedure of 
philosophy exercised around truth, value and meaning.  
 
2. Hermeneutics Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow  
In contrast with the idea of hermeneutics as a new koinè of 
contemporary philosophy, today, the field of hermeneutics is more 
fragmented than ever. However, it is not fragmented by the effect of 
an analogous sectorial hyperspecialism at work in analytic 
philosophy; it is fragmented because it is an ‘exploded’ field. 
Hermeneutics is currently practised in the most varied, as productive 
as vague and weak, ways, and in such strict modalities as in 
uncontrolled multidisciplinary melting pots. The problem is 
exacerbated by the fact that the contemporary philosophical 
panorama forms a fragmentary multiverse. 
Wide diffusion of analytic philosophy in different theoretical-
speculative and practical fields and territories does not represent the 
alternative answer, but rather is causally implicated in the problem. 
In one way or another all analytic philosophies are focused on 
fragments of fragments. This new characterisation of current 
philosophy has an uneasy framing in the history of thought and 
speculative traditions. Here too, the theoretical ground assumes an 
orderly arrangement according to the cultural perspective ‘from 
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which’ or ‘for which’ it is observed. This is immediately seen trying to 
determine a reasoned collocation of critical hermeneutics in relation 
to traditional philosophical hermeneutics. It can not be done by 
demonstration, by trial or by argumentation; it can only be done by 
argumented statement. 
To classify Anglo-Saxon philosophy as ‘analytic’ in contrast to the 
European philosophy understood as ‘Hermeneutical’ still has certain 
diffusion. In his 1987 article, Gianni Vattimo noted since the 1980s in 
the U.S.A., hermeneutics has been used to qualify more or less all 
contemporary European-continental philosophy without distinctions 
between phenomenology, existentialism and hermeneutics. Thus, it 
has been considering Gadamer, Ricoeur, Derrida, Foucault, Apel and 
Habermas as members of the same hermeneutical family (see 
Vattimo, 1987: 4). In Europe, this is a still surprising simplification, 
even more surprising considering the growing number of areas and 
places in which analytic philosophy, not hermeneutic or 
phenomenology, is embraced and practised. There is no doubt: 
analytic philosophy is the new koinè.   
Beyond this discourse, the framing of critical hermeneutics 
requires a specific determination about philosophical hermeneutics 
within the history of hermeneutics. The historical approach has been 
largely relevant, in this: in identifying in Schleirmacher’s work the 
first starting point of hermeneutics as philosophy, and of a 
philosophical hermeneutics anchored to an exegetical tradition. In 
this sense, the work performed by Schleiermacher is significant and 
particular. His speculative developments on hermeneutical issues are 
closely intertwined with procedural and theoretical problems of 
hermeneutics as a technique. From here it has been possible to 
retrospectively anchor the whole philological, rhetorical and 
speculative tradition of Alexandrine hermeneutics to the advent of 
Judeo-Christian and patristic hermeneutics; from medieval exegesis 
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(Scoto Eriugena et alii) to Renaissance philology (Valla, Ficino, Luther 
et alii; according to Whilelm Dilthey, scientific hermeneutics started 
with Protestantism; see. Dilthey, 1966: 597); from the seventeenth 
to eighteenth century biblical hermeneutics (Dannhauer, Ernesti, Vico 
et alii) to historical and (proper) philosophical hermeneutics (Vico, 
Herder). 
Reflecting on critical hermeneutics in reference to contemporary 
philosophical hermeneutics, the first dilemma concerns the possibility 
of a specific intra-disciplinary framework or whether it refers not only 
to the historical diatribe between Gadamer, Bubner, Habermas, Apel, 
etc. but also to the models conceived for human and social sciences. 
According to Javier Recas Bayón, the ‘critical’ adjective became 
paradigmatic and generalisable starting with Gadamer’s Truth and 
Method (see Bayón, 2006: 22). According to him, despite being a 
broad and ambiguous concept, critical hermeneutics represents better 
than any other concept the perspectives of those who propose and 
require a critical extension of the hermeneutics of ontological 
affiliation. Human understanding is critical, and this critical 
understanding is ontologically rooted. Critical hermeneutics is a 
demystifying hermeneutics of the sense, and Ricoeur’s idea of a 
hermeneutics of suspicion opposes the traditional idea of ontological 
hermeneutics as appropriation of meaning (see Ib.: 23).  
This is the philosophical framework of critical hermeneutics 
according to Bayón. It is a wide frame, certainly interesting, but not 
without difficulties; above all, general historical philosophical 
difficulties due to a juxtaposition under the brand of ‘critical 
hermeneutics’ of philosophies as different as those of Gadamer and 
Habermas, Rorty and Derrida, Heidegger and Ricoeur.  
According to Bayón, the critical element constitutes the 
cornerstone of a contemporary hermeneutic alternative with respect 
to the tradition of philosophical hermeneutics. Starting from Maurizio 
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Ferraris’ articulation of contemporary hermeneutical philosophy in the 
three main areas of ontological, methodological and critical 
orientation, Bayón tries to reorganise, in an original way the 
speculative work of Gadamer, Habermas, Rorty, Derrida, Heidegger 
and Ricoeur, overcoming Ferraris’ grid. He replaces these figures on 
the basis of the pre-eminence of the critical paradigm in 
contemporary philosophy. And within the framework of this enlarged 
conception of critical hermeneutics, Apel and Habermas are placed on 
the foundationalist front, while Ricoeur and others stay on the anti-
foundationalist front.  
This redetermination of contemporary philosophical hermeneutics 
certainly gives strength and significance to the critical line of 
hermeneutics. However, it places criticism along a mainly 
philosophical line. This is a speculative perspective that 
underestimates the specific potential of critical hermeneutics as a 
theoretical practical procedure. In addition, by extracting critical 
hermeneutics from Ricoeur’s philosophy, the perspective appears 
different both speculatively and methodologically. It is true that 
Ricoeur’s work explicitly mentions critical hermeneutics as a 
philosophy. In fact, the notion of ‘critical hermeneutics’ is used by 
him to define the field of his philosophical exercise of tensional 
mediation between Gadamer’s hermeneutics of tradition and 
Habermas’ critique of ideology. However, I am referring to the 
indirect qualification of  Ricoeur’s critical hermeneutics by considering 
his philosophical work as a whole and (then) by extracting from it his 
general procedural approach (see Ricoeur 1973; see Busacchi, 2013: 
81–127; see Busacchi 2015).  
Where all philosophical hermeneutics seems outdated, or 
reduced and transfigured into some deconstructive, nihilistic or post-
speculative formulation, the path of critical hermeneutics seems to 
remain open and extremely fertile even for philosophical research. 
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And this requires reconsidering the entire theoretical-speculative and 
practical field of philosophical hermeneutics, keeping the aim of 
reconsideration from the procedural point of view. The challenge of a 
rigorous interpretation, of an interpretation as a scientific process, is 
the same as that posed by Emilio Betti in his Teoria generale 
dell’interpretazione in 1955. However Betti’s enterprise is in some 
way philosophically bound to and limited by Heidegger and 
Gadamer’s ontological perspective to which it is opposed. Where the 
latter understand hermeneutics in the circular movement between the 
Being-there (or presence; Dasein) and the Being (Sein), and 
therefore hermeneutics as expression and production of the Being. 
Betti persists in considering hermeneutics philosophically, embracing 
the relationship between the subject and the world and indirectly 
between the subject and the Being. To him, hermeneutics is the 
clarification or, rather, the recognition of the Being and the world; 
and, therefore, hermeneutics is conceived as a clarification or, better, 
recognition of the Being through the world (see Ferraris, 1998: 96–
97). The problem is that this alternative generates a partial rigidity 
(for objectification and historicisation) on an ontological conception 
that requires redefinition. It is not only ontology that can be defined 
in alternative ways, without an exclusive focus on the Being or the 
world, but the problem of rigour in interpretation is one among many 
other problems concerning critical hermeneutics validity. Moreover, 
validity and rigour are not the only decisive components for 
determining and recognising the significance and productivity of the 
critical and scientific applications of hermeneutics. 
 
3. Hermeneutics and Ontology 
With critical hermeneutics, I do not intend to take the path of a 
methodology. This, in fact, would be a withdrawal on the technical 
matrix of hermeneutics and even an abandonment of critical 
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hermeneutics work as a philosophical commitment. The challenge 
consists in rigorously articulating a hermeneutic theory as a theory 
and as a speculative procedure. Ricoeur’s philosophy shows the 
concrete possibility of this dual path: on the one hand, a tensional 
exercise of mediation between Gadamer’s hermeneutics of tradition 
and Habermas’ critique of ideology is an example of speculative use 
(and interpretation) of critical hermeneutics; on the other hand, his 
use of and approach to philosophy follows a non-speculative 
procedural model.  
There is first an obstacle to be clarified that concerns the 
connection of this critical hermeneutics with the ontological problem. 
Obviously, because of its dual nature, critical hermeneutics can have 
a free hand in terms of philosophical use (ontology included). Where 
used philosophically, critical hermeneutics can only introduce and 
implement elements of mediation and argumentative rigour, but 
within a philosophical space that remains freely passable (even from 
neo-Heideggerians, neo-Derridians, etc.). More interesting is, 
however, the extra-speculative application of hermeneutics as a 
critical procedure, particularly in its coordinated functioning with 
science. In no way does this constitute a negation of the relation 
between hermeneutics and ontology, nor is it a matter of redefining 
the nature of this relationship; rather it (re)establishes what ontology 
is. The ancient claim of a certain philosophical hermeneutics to 
establish itself as ontology is part of a determined history. Not all 
hermeneutics said, says and can say with Nietzsche: ‘facts do not 
exist, only interpretations’; nor is all hermeneutics interested in the 
experience of the Being in a Transcendent or Pantheistic sense (as 
Heidegger and others did). Neither more nor less than scientific work, 
hermeneutics remains close to the ontological discourse insofar as it 
deals with facts and with the interpretation of facts. In this context, 
the downsizing of what is the content of ontology parallels critical 
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hermeneutics with scientific discourse, revealing at the same time its 
specificity. 
Critical hermeneutics does not have an idea of the primacy of 
interpretation because it is an exercise that (as we will see it) is 
articulated between description, explanation and comprehension, 
under a properly interpretive linking functioning. Here is the 
operation of critical hermeneutics: to describe, to know, to 
understand and to evaluate how a state of things is or must be, by 
considering as ‘a state of things’ the following cases: natural objects, 
social elements, cultural products, psychic (or internal) states, 
dispositions, actions and values. Here a functioning at both 
theoretical and practical level is involved. In addition, there is a 
meta-theoretical plan for the application of critical hermeneutics; and 
it is here that a first specificity aspect emerges. To the extent that 
knowing, understanding and evaluating things and states of things 
involves language, conceptual networks and a (pre-)theoretical 
framework, critical hermeneutics can work flexibly to adapt its 
procedures and functioning to the form and logic of a given 
descriptive construction, of a given legitimative system, etc. This is 
not a relativistic or debole approach in a philosophical sense. It is a 
principle of rigour in relation to a due referential paradigm or a 
transcendental ideal, as well as a further possibility of support for 
scientific and non-scientific knowledge. The possibility and 
effectiveness of a truth as truth remains: there is, in fact, a state and 
reality of the world beyond the historical-cultural framework of our 
way of living and knowing, as well as there is a true state of the past, 
about how things have happened, that is independent from means 
and the cognitive, reconstructive, interpretative and representative 
resources we have today. Certainly, there are those who believe that 
we are nothing more than ‘brains in a bath’, but where not 
understood in the original sense of a mental experiment (Putnam) 
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this discourse is just valid as a mythology, as a thesis without 
consistency and is useful for nihilistic believers only.  
Critical exercise of hermeneutics also concerns science at a more 
philosophical level, insofar as the latter is becoming increasingly 
involved with metaphysics. I say more: that today science is 
tightening more dangerously with a certain radicalised ontology, 
contributing to the strengthening of a metaphysic credo around only 
biological and natural data. To illustrate this point, it is opportune to 
set the problem in the Husserlian formulation (as Husserl’s Krisis 
suggests), to which critical hermeneutics offers elements of 
correlation and alternative. ‘Correlation’, because the 
phenomenological point of view introduces the discourse on the life-
world, which is an application field for both eidetic-descriptive and 
hermeneutic philosophy; ‘alternative’, because the phenomenological 
approach remains trapped in a philosophical a priori, where critical 
hermeneutics can operate without or, rather, can take into account, 
an a priori in a non-exclusive way. The pre-eminence (or even 
radicalised antecedency) of a subject’s point of view is this 
philosophical a priori of phenomenology. On the one hand, we have 
the paradigmatic model of science process as organised according to 
a categorial logic (in a more or less sophisticated Aristotelian sense), 
that is a categorism with a substantialist tendency. And here lies the 
root of the Parmenidism which, according to Enrico Nicoletti, forms 
metaphysics, and also science (see Nicoletti, 1989). In his re-reading 
of Husserl’s Krisis, he points out how the German philosopher 
considered the correlation of philosophy and science within European 
or Western crisis of reason. Furthermore, he recalls that this crisis 
does not concern science as a methodologically constructed 
knowledge, but science as a global interpretation of life and reality 
(see Id.: 246). ‘Science faces a crisis (...) when it elevates its own 
objectiveness to the authentic representation of the world and of life. 
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It is a dilation of the sense of science in which the true face of reality 
and life, from which science itself springs, remains concealed. In this 
context, science acquires a universal and necessary value: that is to 
say, it becomes philosophical. This is the fall of science into 
objectivism; it is becoming philosophy’ (Ib.).  
On the other hand, we have phenomenology, whose alternative 
system is expressive of a metaphysics of subjectivity, where the 
substantiality of the Cogito is opposed to the categorial substantiality: 
the subject is substance, therefore the life-world itself is transformed 
into a new metaphysical filed. Phenomenology aims to play the role of 
liberator of science from its objectivism and representationism, which 
is a sick reflection of the crisis of modern rationality. At the same 
time, it aims to safeguard the methodology of science-technique; but 
it contrasts science’s radicalisation with a new metaphysics of the 
subjective or a conscientialist metaphysics. It is certainly still 
significant that the phenomenological aim is exemplified by the 
eidetic motto zurück zu den Sachen selbst! The ‘returning to the 
things themselves’ is, in fact, a sign of the return to the world, which 
establishes and recognises the pre-eminent value of the world with 
respect to an objectivising and radicalised science. In Husserl’s 
perspective, the fundamental operation that phenomenology must 
perform with respect to science is to define a foundation of a rigorous 
science of the life-world from which sciences are born, and with 
respect to which sciences owe relate in order to not lose the sense 
and limitation of their work. Therefore, the principle of scientific 
objectivity becomes relative to the transcendental foundation of the 
life-world, which is the only possible foundation, according to Husserl 
(see Id.: 245).  
Critical hermeneutics, insofar as it is also exercised in 
problematic reference to its phenomenological anchorage, can 
remedy this risk of ‘re-sacralisation’ and metaphysical relapse 
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precisely by exploiting the critical-reflexive function. In this way, it 
does not float on the surface of questions and problems, nor does it 
keep implicit or hidden any uncomfortable and ‘powerful’ truth. It 
simply operates under a domain of prevailing contingent 
commitment, and it can suspend its argumentative-demonstrative 
commitment concerning last things, which can be so much as not a 
motive of philosophical interest. To do and not be engaged on it does 
not imply an emptying of philosophical work value and meaning. 
Critical hermeneutics can support it as it can also evade it. And a 
similar argument is valid with respect to the (Husserlian) objective 
concerning the phenomenological reflective clarification lacking in 
science that is the sense of its own procedure. Here, hermeneutics 
can give a productive critical contribution without self-interpreting in 
the role of a re-foundational discipline and without entering into the 
field of ultimate implications. To give an example, the cosisation or 
dehumanisation determined by a radical scientist approach in the 
field of human relationships can be the subject of an effective 
criticism of the distortion of public communication or of psychological 
impoverishment or social alienation without ‘inconveniencing’ the 
ontological-existential discourse of an authentic or inauthentic 
existence as explained in Heidegger’s early work, Being and Time 
(1927).           
 
4. Hermeneutics and Epistemology 
The renewed interest of the last 40 years of epistemological research 
for interpretation and the use of hermeneutical models and 
procedures in science is due, in particular, to the crisis of the neo-
empiristic conception of scientific theories (Kuhn, Hanson, 
Feyerabend et alii; see Parrini 1998). The current scenario still 
remains fragmented and magmatic, with certain strongly polarised 
proposals (new scientism or new Parmenidism vs. relativism). It is 
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interesting to note how in all cases the problematic node remains the 
determination of what is objectivity and what are the possibilities and 
forms of valid knowledge.  
And it is interesting to note how the distance between the 
alleged rigourism of natural science’s methodologies and the 
‘problematically rigorous’ character of the social and historical-
hermeneutical sciences has now been reduced. There is an explicit 
hermeneutical problematisation (on truth, evaluation, procedure and 
interpretation) that is internal to the natural sciences’ different 
methodologies (hypothetical-deductive, inductive, falsificationist 
methodology, etc.). And much methodological research in the social, 
historical and psychological fields aims at the application of non-
hermeneutical models and therefore has an approach to the problem 
of interpretation under determined procedural or epistemic aspects. 
Paolo Parrini remarks the methodological parallelism that 
characterises the interpretative sciences and the natural sciences 
(Parrini, 1998: 15), by thematising the detailed comparison between 
the empirical process and the hermeneutical procedure that Adolf 
Grünbaum developed by studying Habermas and Ricoeur’s 
interpretation of psychoanalysis (Grünbaum 1984). The 
methodological link is intertwined and strengthened through a 
redefinition of objectivity according to the critical-analytical analysis 
developed by Mary Hesse (Hesse, 1980), namely: (1) non-
separability of data from theory; (2) theories not as hypothetical-
deductive schemes but as a perceptive-cognitive classification of the 
facts themselves; (3) logical-theoretical synthesis in constituting facts 
and logical-causal correlations between facts; (4) metaphorical 
dimension of all the scientific language and of the representative 
constructions through which science interprets nature; and (5) 
terminological value given by the reference to the theory and not to 
the reality of the facts (170, 172–173; see Parrini, 1998: 15). Parrini 
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is able to strongly highlight the parallelism recalling (according to 
Gadamer) the two general and characteristic traits of the hermeneutic 
work: (1) the role attributed to the prejudices as conditions for 
understanding; and (2) the hermeneutic circle, that is the 
dependence of the whole comprehension from the single components 
(of a text) and vice versa the understanding of the single components 
starting from the whole. As Parrini explains, ‘there is therefore a 
substantial similarity between the empirical and the hermeneutical 
method. Science also has to do with an equipped nature of 
conceptual assumptions and uses these same assumptions and 
experience data to develop hypotheses on specific issues’ (17). 
Undoubtedly, this recognition is not limited to the interest 
represented by the parallel in itself, but it implies the implementation 
of a certain degree of epistemic relativism, both in the (prevalently) 
interpretative sciences and in the (prevalently) descriptive-explicative 
sciences. It is in this way that the problem arises of the compatibility 
of relativism with the possibility of objectivity and truth as the 
fundamental objective of scientific and hermeneutical practices (see 
Id.: 18). For Parrini, the alternatively viable ways are as follows: (1) 
the abandonment of the epistemological project for the hermeneutical 
one (that is the way exemplified by Richard Rorty’s conversational 
position; see Id.: 20–22); (2) the awareness of subjective points of 
reference and intrasystemic value of objectivity (that is, the 
recognition of partial autonomy of cognitive experience with respect 
to epistemic conditioning: this is the way indicated by Hans 
Reichenbach and considered by Gadamer; see Id.: 23–24); (3) 
objectivity and truth as trans-regulatively transcendental ideals (see 
Id., 25–26).  The latter, which is Parrini’s privileged position, can be 
understood as a criterion applicable to the ambit of both the 
descriptive-explanatory and hermeneutical disciplines. At the same 
time, it is an ideal theoretical-philosophical position, since the 
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relativistic oscillation is not reducible to a threshold of neutrality. In 
other words, it is a referential transcendentalism, a transcendental 
ideal. Here is the transversality of hermeneutics and the 
indispensable hermeneutic-epistemological connection. Today, even 
for the empirical sciences has become impossible to formulate 
historical and purely formal criteria of scientificity. However, it is 
possible to compare theories with respect to the canons or values 
(Kuhn) that shape the scientific process according to its own 
progressive historical-knowing refinement (see Parrini, 2002: 156). 
Certainly, this can also take the path of a strong relativism, so that 
‘truth’ and ‘objectivity’ are strongly conceived as inevitably connected 
and dependent on cultural adhesion and intersubjective participation, 
as it is at work within the procedural context of accreditation-
recognition from a community of scientists.  
Parrini does not have this in mind. He rather conceives the 
historical-cultural progress of methodological and epistemological 
knowledge as transcendent from a due historical-cultural context to 
the extent that it is progressive. This transcendentalist path aims to 
limit the relativistic drift and can be interestingly correlated with the 
analysis that Luigi Perissinotto proposes regarding the Donald 
Davidson vs. Michael Dummett diatribe on the objectivity of knowing 
or understanding. Dummett (Dummett, 1986: 464; see Perissinotto, 
2002: 93–117) goes back to Ludwig Wittgenstein to refute Davidson’s 
thesis that every understanding is inevitably interpretation. Dummett 
points out, as a Wittgenstein’s central observation (around how to 
follow a rule), that ‘there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an 
interpretation’ (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, section 
201); and, analogously, ‘there is a way of understanding a sentence 
or an utterance that does not consist in putting an interpretation on 
it’. There is no absolute freedom or a completely decontextualised or 
ahistorical operating: to know and to follow the rules are intertwined 
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with the specific reality of a form of life. As Perissinotto remarks, if 
Platonism reifies and mythises the rules, who maintains the idea that 
between the rule and its particular applications there is always an 
interpretation he/she is denying and dissolving them. And with 
respect to these two outcomes, Wittgenstein’s move consists in 
emphasising that it is in its use that a rule is a rule (see Id.: 114) As 
stated in section 202 of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, 
‘obeying a rule is a practice’. The linguistic game is not a system of 
propositions to the foundation of which there would be certain 
propositions that are true in an evident, immediate and 
incontrovertible way. A foundation of the linguistic game is neither 
seeing nor knowledge but our acting. And this acting is not a blind 
acting that awaits a justification, nor an uncertain acting until the 
alternative basis for exclusion is found; nor is it an acting that can be 
chosen or abandoned in radical and absolute freewill (see Id.: 116–
117). It is not the claim of eternity and absoluteness of the rules of 
scientific play that allows the rigour and certainty of advancement in 
knowledge; but rather the stability, consistency and continuity in life 
experience and within a due historical-cultural context of the rules 
given in a scientific game that determine its degree of truth, 
legitimacy and value. Change is possible but rules are not arbitrary. 
They are the result of the sedimentation of knowledge and know-how 
from generation to generation. They have become that canon or 
transcendental ideal on which we build a scale of certainty of 
knowledge and a scale of greater or lesser relativity, correctness, 
validity, credibility of a certain interpretation and knowledge. 
 
5. Critical Hermeneutics   
Certainly, the critical determination of hermeneutics was a passage of 
secondary importance in Ricoeur’s philosophical-hermeneutical 
evolution. He progressed from the paradigm of interpretation of 
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symbols and myths to the interpretation of symbols within psychic 
inner life, from the interpretation of metaphor and the text to 
narrative hermeneutics, from a description-interpretation of action 
and Self to the philosophy of translation and hermeneutics of 
recognition. However, within Ricoeur’s work there are intrinsic 
possibilities to extract and develop a procedural methodology that are 
able to work both in/for a theoretical field and in/for a speculative 
field.  
Today’s specialisation and articulation of knowledge concerning 
the human being has determined a paradoxical situation: on the one 
hand, there is an increase in complexness and deepening of the 
universe of discourses referred to the human being, and these 
discourses are fragmented, not-harmonised and in different case are 
even contradictory; on the other hand, thanks to the human 
advancement in science, philosophy, culture and art, ‘perhaps for the 
first time’, it is concretely possible ‘to encompass in a single question 
the problem of the unification of human discourse’ (Ricoeur, 1970: 
3).  
In his 1965 essay on Freud and Philosophy, Ricoeur expressed 
an ambivalent position towards such a problem: on the one hand, he 
expresses the clear position of a perspective of resolution of it via a 
(non-exactly determined) philosophy of language; on the other hand 
he expresses the effective possibility to apply and experience such an 
interdisciplinary-comprehensive-universalised knowledge or such a 
‘comprehensive philosophy of language’ (4). He writes, in fact: ‘I 
doubt (…) that such a philosophy could be elaborated by any one 
man. A modern Leibniz with the ambition and capacity to achieve it 
would have to be an accomplished mathematician, a universal 
exegete, a critic versed in several of the arts, and a good 
psychoanalyst’ (Ib.).   
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Through his work, Ricoeur has explored and put in connection 
many different fields of scientific and non-scientific knowledge. His 
vast work, which is defined as fragmented, but somehow unified or 
continuous, touches and traverses hermeneutics, epistemology, 
religion, myth, rhetoric, linguistics, literature, history, political theory, 
psychology, psychopathology, neurobiology, law, anthropology, social 
science and more. He even puts in connection and intertwines 
different traditions and approaches: phenomenology, philosophical 
hermeneutics, reflective philosophy, psychoanalysis, structuralism, 
philosophy of language, philosophy of action, and more. Ricoeur’s 
work offers in itself an example of how philosophy can play the 
mediatory role of an interdisciplinary analysis, theoretical synthesis 
and theoretical-practical correlation. Philosophy has a vast tradition 
or series of traditions. It has a vast, rich and varied conceptual and 
theoretical patrimony. It has a flexibility for theoretical-practical uses 
and applications that other disciplines do not / can not have.  
In addition, Ricoeur’s work, which is not a type of comprehensive 
philosophy of language but an interdisciplinary hermeneutical 
research based on description, interpretation and critical reflection, 
offers the concrete example of the potential of critical hermeneutics 
as a methodology and epistemology for culture and science 
(especially for human and social sciences). 
In the important introductory essay entitled From Text to Action 
(1986), Ricoeur summarises the methodological set of reflective 
philosophy, phenomenology and hermeneutics that he followed in his 
research. Without any doubt, Ricoeur has followed this 
methodological perspective, but other aspects of his research and 
particularly his epistemological-procedural model called ‘hermeneutic 
arc’, has played an additional, important role. This model or theory 
suggests more than a reflective-based interpretative description, it 
suggests the idea of a hermeneutic-based philosophy exercised as a 
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theoretical and critical practice. Many explanatory and anchoring 
points are already present in Ricoeur’s 1970 paper, ‘Qu’est-ce qu’un 
texte? Expliquer et comprendre’ (Ricoeur, 1970b). First, he 
encourages the connection between critical hermeneutics to the 
epistemology of the hermeneutic arc. Among Italian scholarly experts 
on philosophical hermeneutics, Franco Bianco was the one to have 
grasped the epistemological centrality of the hermeneutic arc theory, 
especially in reference to the broader contemporary debate around 
the philosophical discourse and its uses among the natural and the 
human-social sciences (see Bianco, 2002).  
Secondly, there is an already indirect-but-established connection 
of critical hermeneutics to Freud’s psychoanalysis. Because both the 
epistemological and methodological constitution of Ricoeur’s theory of 
the hermeneutic arc is realised thematising the theories of text, 
action and history, but even by considering Freud’s psychoanalysis 
problematic case as a productive example of a multi-epistemic and 
multi-methodological discipline; and thus, as a paradigmatic example 
of an explanatory and interpretative discipline and procedure.   
Critical hermeneutics is an interdisciplinary engaged philosophy, 
exercised in theoretical-practical fields and as practical theory (see 
Busacchi, 2015). It is a methodological model that is descriptive as 
well as explanatory, interpretative as well as reflective and analytical 
as well as comprehensive. This is not a mixture of confusing free-
functions but an articulated series of disposals coordinated with a 
certain degree of rigour and argumentative logic under the work of 
critical hermeneutics.  
To conclude, by considering the more general and typical uses, 
factors and characteristics of Ricoeur’s applications, we can 
summarises its main functions as follows: (1) the dialectical and 
dialogical approach as an ideal of theoretical and interdisciplinary 
research, as able to put different theories and disciplines in 
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productive connections; (2) the interdisciplinary approach as a 
method (which is mirrored in critical hermeneutics’ open and 
transversal methodology and epistemology); (3) the mediatory 
function of an explicative-comprehensive argumentative approach on 
a theoretical and practical level; (4) the articulation and 
differentiation of the philosophical procedure by analytic-reflective 
degrees, theoretical and practical levels, thematic and disciplinary 
domains, and methodological registers; (5) the neutral-value use(s) 
of critical hermeneutics as an interdisciplinary approach; (5bis) the 
possibility to an evaluative use of critical hermeneutics as an applied, 
interpretative-argumentative philosophy of tension and mediation; 
(6) the reflective-hermeneutic work from non-philosophical 
dimensions to philosophical dimension and vice versa; (7) the 
prevalence in considering and using philosophy as a theoretical 
practice; and (8) the philosophical engagement within the real life, at 
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